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Abstract
We consider a general class of Bayesian Games where each players utility depends on his type (possibly
multidimensional) and on the strategy profile and where players’ types are distributed independently.
We show that if their full information version for any fixed instance of the type profile is a smooth game
then the Price of Anarchy bound implied by the smoothness property, carries over to the Bayes-Nash
Price of Anarchy. We show how some proofs from the literature (item bidding auctions, greedy auctions)
can be cast as smoothness proofs or be simplified using smoothness. For first price item bidding with
fractionally subadditive bidders we actually manage to improve by much the existing result [6] from 4 to
e
e−1
≈ 1.58. This also shows a very interesting separation between first and second price item bidding
since second price item bidding has PoA at least 2 even under complete information. For a larger class
of Bayesian Games where the strategy space of a player also changes with his type we are able to show
that a slightly stronger definition of smoothness also implies a Bayes-Nash PoA bound. We show how
weighted congestion games actually satisfy this stronger definition of smoothness. This allows us to
show that the inefficiency bounds of weighted congestion games known in the literature carry over to
incomplete versions where the weights of the players are private information. We also show how an
incomplete version of a natural class of monotone valid utility games, called effort market games are
universally (1, 1)-smooth. Hence, we show that incomplete versions of effort market games where the
abilities of the players and their budgets are private information has Bayes-Nash PoA at most 2.
1 Introduction
In our information era, with the advent of electronic markets, most systems have grown so large scale that
central coordination has become infeasible. In addition players are less and less informed of the actual game
they are playing and the type of players they are competing against. Coordinating the players is too costly
and assuming that the players know all the parameters of the game is too simplistic. Such a realization
renders mandatory the study of efficiency in non-cooperative games of incomplete information.
Ever since the introduction of the concept of the Price of Anarchy, a large part of the algorithmic game
theory literature has studied the effects of selfishness in the efficiency of a system. In a unifying paper,
Roughgarden [11], gave a general technique, called smoothness, for proving inefficiency results in games and
portrayed how many of the results in the literature can be cast in his framework. In addition, he showed that
such types of inefficiency proofs extend directly to almost every reasonable non-cooperative solution concept,
such as pure nash equilibria, mixed nash equilibria, correlated equilibria and coarse-correlated equilibria.
However, such a unification holds only under the strong assumption of complete information 1: players
know every parameter of the game and no player has private information. Such an assumption is pretty
strong and if we want models that could capture realistic environments we need to cope with games were
players have incomplete information.
In this work we manage to show how to extend this unification to a significant class of games of incomplete
information: basically we show that if a complete information game is smooth then the inefficiency bound
given by the smoothness argument carries over to incomplete information versions of the game where players
have private parameters and each player’s utility depends on his parameter and the actions of the rest of the
players. Hence, we manage to unify Price of Anarchy with Bayesian Price of Anarchy analysis for a large
class of games.
1Recently we became aware that an independent work by Roughgarden with some overlapping results on extending smooth-
ness to incomplete information games has been under submission to a conference since February 6, 2012.
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Many of the games studied in the literature such as Weighted Congestion Games have been shown to
be tight games: the best efficiency bound provable with a smoothness argument is the best bound possible.
For such games our analysis shows that the bayesian price of anarchy bound is also tight, since complete
information is a special case of incomplete information and hence lower bounds on inefficiency carry over
to the incomplete information model. Hence, this immediately implies that the efficiency guarrantees for
a tight class of games don’t depend on the information pocessed by the players: having more information
doesn’t imply better efficiency and having less information doen’t imply worse efficiency.
Our approach also manages to put several Bayesian Price of Anarchy results that exist in the literature
under the smoothness framework. Specifically we show how our main theorem can be applied to get an
improved result for first price item-bidding with subadditive bidders and how to get a much simpler proof
of good approximation guarrantees of the greedy mechanisms introduced by Lucier and Borodin [8].
1.1 Related Work
There has been a long line of research on quantifying inefficiency of equilibria starting from [7] who introduced
the notion of the price of anarchy. A recent work by Roughgarden [11] managed to unify several of these
results under a proof framework called smoothness and also showed that such inefficiency proofs also carry
over to inefficiency of coarse correlated equilibria. Moreover, he showed that such techniques give tight
results for the well-studied class of congestion games. Later, Bhawalkar et al. [2] also showed that it
produces tight results for the larger class of weighted congestion games. Another recent work by Schoppman
and Roughgarden [12] copes with games with continuous strategy spaces and shows how the smoothness
framework should be adapted for such games to produce tighter results. The introduce the new notion of
local smoothness for such games and showed that if an inefficiency upper bound proof lies in this framework
then it also carries over to correlated equilibria.
There have also been several works on quantifying the inefficiency of incomplete information games,
mainly in the context of auctions. A series of papers by Paes Leme and Tardos [10], Lucier and Paes Leme
[9] and Caragiannis et al [4] studied the ineffficiency of Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second price
auction. Lucier and Borodin studied Bayes-Nash Equilibria of non-truthful auctions that are based on greedy
allocation algorithms [8]. A series of three papers, Christodoulou, Kovacs and Schapira [5], Bhawalkar and
Roughgarden [3] and Hassidim, Kaplan, Mansour, Nisan [6], studied the inefficiency of Bayes-Nash equilibria
of non-truthful combinatorial auctions that are based on running simultaneous separate item auctions for
each item. However, many of the results in this line of work where specific to the context and a unifying
framework doesn’t exist. Lucier and Paes Leme [9] introduced the concept of semi-smoothness and showed
that their proof for the inefficiency of the generalized second price auction falls into this category. However,
semi-smoothness is a much more restrictive notion of smoothness than just requiring that every complete
information instance of the game to be smooth.
1.2 Model and Notation
We consider the following model of Bayesian Games: Each player has a type space Ti and a probability
distribution Di defined on Ti. The distributions Di are independent, the types Ti are disjoint and we denote
with D = ×iDi. Each player has a set of actions Ai and let A = ×iAi. The utility of a player is a function
ui : Ti × A → R. The strategy of each player is a function si : Ti → Ai. At times we will use the notation
s(t) = (si(ti))i∈N to denote the vector of actions given a type profile t and s−i(t−i) = (sj(tj))j 6=i to denote
the vector of actions for all players except i. We could also define cost minimization games where each player
has a cost ci : Ti × A → R. All of our results hold for both utility maximization and cost minimization
games.
The two basic assumptions that we made in the class of Bayesian Games that we examine is that a players
utility is affected by the other players’ types only implicitly through their actions and not directly from their
types and that the players’ types are distributed independently. The above class of games is general enough
and we portray several nice examples of such Bayesian Games. An interesting future direction is to try and
relax any of these two assumptions or show that smoothness is not sufficient to prove bounds without these
assumptions.
As our solution concept we will use the most dominant solution concept in incomplete information
games, the Bayes-Nash Equilibrium (BNE). Our results hold for mixed Bayes-Nash Equilibria too, but for
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simplicity of presentation we are going to focus on Bayes-Nash Equilibria in pure strategies. A Bayes-Nash
Equilibrium is a strategy profile such that each player maximizes his expected utility conditional on his
private information:
∀a ∈ Ai : Et−i|ti [u
ti
i (s(t))] ≥ Et−i|ti [u
ti
i (a, s−i(t−i)]
Given a strategy profile s the social welfare of the game is defined as the expected sum of player utilities:
SW (s) = Et[SW
t(s(t))] = Et[
∑
i
utii (s(t))]
In addition given a type profile t we denote with Opt(t) the action profile that achieves maximum social
welfare for type profile t: Opt(t) = argmaxa∈A SW
t(a).
As our measure of inefficiency we will use the Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy which is defined as the ratio
of the expected optimal social welfare over the expected social welfare achieved at the worst Bayes-Nash
Equilibrium:
sup
s is BNE
Et[SW (Opt(t))]
Et[SW (s(t))]
2 Constant Strategy Space Bayesian Games and Smoothness
In this section we give a general theorem on how one can derive Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy results
using the smoothness framework introduced in [11]. We first give a definition of smoothness suitable for
incomplete information games. Our definition just states that the game is smooth in the sense of [11] for
each instantiation of the type profile.
Definition 1 A bayesian utility maximization game is said to be (λ, µ)-smooth if for any t ∈ T and for any
pair of action profiles a, a′ ∈ A: ∑
i
utii (a
′
i, a−i) ≥ λSW
t(a′)− µSW t(a)
For the case of complete information games (i.e. the set of possible type profiles is a singleton) Rough-
garden [11] showed that the efficiency achieved by any coarse-correlated equilibrium (superset of pure nash,
mixed nash and correlated equilibrium) is at least a λ/(1+µ) fraction of the optimal social welfare. In other
words the price of anarchy of any of these solution concepts is at most (1 + µ)/λ. Our main results shows
that the latter also extends to Bayes-Nash Equilibria for the case of incomplete information.
Theorem 2 (Main Theorem) If a Bayesian Game is (λ, µ)-smooth then it has Bayes-Nash Price of An-
archy at most 1+µ
λ
.
Proof. Let Opt(t) = (Opti(t))i∈N be the action profile that maximizes social welfare given a type profile
t. Suppose that player i with type ti switches to playing Opti(ti, w−i) for some type profile w−i. Let s be
a Bayes-Nash Equilibrium. Then we have:
Et−i [u
ti
i (s(t))] ≥ Et−i [u
ti
i (Opti(ti, w−i), s−i(t−i))]
Taking expectation over ti and over all possible type profiles w−i we get:
Et[u
ti
i (s(t))] ≥ Ew−iEtiEt−i [u
ti
i (Opti(ti, w−i), s−i(t−i))]
= Ew−iEwiEt−i [u
wi
i (Opti(wi, w−i), s−i(t−i))]
= EtiEw−iEwiEt−i [u
wi
i (Opti(wi, w−i), s−i(t−i))]
= EtEw [u
wi
i (Opti(w), s−i(t−i))]
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Adding the above inequality for all players and using the smoothness property we get:
Et[SW
t(s(t))] =
∑
i
Et[u
ti
i (s(t))] ≥
∑
i
EtEw[u
wi
i (Opti(w), s−i(t−i))]
= EtEw[
∑
i
uwii (Opti(w), s−i(t−i))]
≥ EtEw[λSW
w(Opt(w)) − µSWw(s(t))]
= λEw [SW
w(Opt(w))] − µ
∑
i
EtEw [u
wi
i (si(ti), s−i(t−i))] (1)
If in the pre-last line we had SW t(s(t)) then we would directly get our result. However, the fact that there
is this misalignment we need more work. In fact we are going to prove that:
EtEw[SW
w(s(t))] ≤ Et[SW
t(s(t))] (2)
To achieve this we are going to use again the Bayes-Nash Equilibrium definition. But now we are going
to use it in the following sense: no player i of some type wi wants to deviate to playing as if he was some
other type ti. This translates to:
Et−i [u
wi
i (si(ti), s−i(t−i)] ≤ Et−i [u
wi
i (si(wi), s−i(t−i)]
Taking expectation over ti and w we have:
EwEt[u
wi
i (si(ti), s−i(t−i)] ≤ EwiEw−iEtiEt−i [u
wi
i (si(wi), s−i(t−i)]
= EwiEt−i [u
wi
i (si(wi), s−i(t−i)]
= EtiEt−i [u
ti
i (si(ti), s−i(t−i)]
= Et[u
ti
i (s(t))]
Summing over all players gives us inequality 2. Now combining inequality 2 with inequality 1 we get:
Et[SW
t(s(t))] ≥ λEw[SW
w(Opt(w))] − µEt[SW
t(s(t))] (3)
which gives the theorem.
In fact it is easy to see that our above analysis also works for a more relaxed version of smoothness similar
to the variant introduced in [9]:
Definition 3 A Bayesian utility maximization game is said to be (λ, µ)-smooth if for any t ∈ T and a ∈ A,
there exists a strategy profile a′(t) such that:∑
i
utii (a
′
i(t), a−i) ≥ λSW (Opt(t)) − µSW
t(a)
In fact our main proof holds even for a slightly more relaxed smoothness property that will prove useful
in auction settings. Our main theorem works for the following notion of smoothness under the condition
that the utilities of players at equilibrium are non-negative.
Definition 4 A Bayesian utility maximization game is said to be (λ, µ)-smooth if for any t ∈ T and a ∈ A,
there exists a strategy profile a′(t) such that:∑
i
utii (a
′
i(t), a−i) ≥ λSW (Opt(t)) − µ
∑
i∈K⊆[n]
uti(a)
where K is some fixed subset of the players independent of the type profile t and bid profile b.
The reason why the latter definition is useful is that some auction environments might fail to be smooth
with the first definition mainly due to the fact that the utility of players might be non-negative in expectation
at equilibrium but can certainly be negative if we consider an arbitrary bid profile b that is not in equilib-
rium. Hence, the latter helps in settings where at equilibrium utilities are certainly non-negative (individual
rationality) but there are strategy profiles at which a player might be getting negative utility.
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3 Item-Bidding Auctions
In this section we consider the Item-Bidding Auctions studied in Christodoulou et al [5], Bhawalkar and
Roughgarden [3] and Hassidim et al. [6].
We first prove a smoothness result for First Price Item-Bidding Auctions for fractionally subadditive
bidders. Fractionally subadditive bidders are subcase of additive bidders and a generalization of submodular
bidders. Our results imply a big improvement in existing results. Specifically Hassidim et al show that
for fractionally subadditive bidders the Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy is at most 4 (and at most 4β for
β-fractionally subadditive. We show that it is at most e
e−1 ≈ 1.58 (and at most
e
e−1β correspondingly).
Thus our result gives the same guarantees for first price item bidding auctions as those existing for second
price item bidding auctions (e.g. Christodoulou et al [5], Bhawalkar et al [3]).
Theorem 5 First Price Item-Bidding Auctions are (12 , 0)-semi-smooth for fractionally subadditive bidders.
Proof. Consider a valuation profile v and a bid profile b. Let Opt(v) be the optimal allocation for that type
profile. Let Opti(v) be the set that player i gets atOpt(v). Let a = (a1, . . . , am) be the maximizing additive
valuation for player i for Opti(v), i.e. vi(Opti(v)) =
∑
j∈Opti(v)
aj and ∀S 6= Opti(v) : vi(S) ≥
∑
j∈S aj
(Such an a exists by the definition of fractionally subadditive valuations). Suppose that player i switches to
bidding aj/2 for each j ∈ Opti(v) and 0 everywhere else. Denote with b
′
i(v) such a deviation. Let Xi be
the items that he wins after the deviation. This means that for all j ∈ Opti(v)−Xi : pj(b) ≥ aj/2 and for
all j ∈ Xi player i pays exactly aj/2. Thus we have:
ui(b
′
i(v), b−i) ≥ vi(Xi)−
∑
j∈Xi
aj
2
≥
∑
j∈Xi
aj −
∑
j∈Xi
aj
2
=
∑
j∈Xi
aj
2
≥
∑
j∈Xi
aj
2
+
∑
j∈Opti(v)−Xi
aj
2
− pj(b)
≥
∑
j∈Opti(v)
aj
2
−
∑
j∈Opti(v)−Xi
pj(b)
≥
∑
j∈Opti(v)
aj
2
−
∑
j∈Opti(v)
pj(b)
=
vi(Opti(v))
2
−
∑
j∈Opti(v)
pj(b)
Now summing over all players the second term on the right hand side will become the sum of prices over
all items, since the sets Opti(v) are disjoint. Thus we get:
∑
i
uvii (b
′
i(v), b−i) +
∑
j∈[m]
pj(b) ≥
∑
i vi(Opti(v))
2
=
1
2
SW v(Opt(v)) (4)
Now the above inequality gives us the smoothness property. To completely fit it in our smoothness
model, we should also view the seller as a player with only one strategy and only one type and whose utility
is the sum of payments. His optimal deviation is then the trivial of doing nothing. Then the left hand side
of the above inequality is the sum of the utilities of all the players (including the seller) had each of them
unilaterally deviated to their optimal strategy.
In fact considering randomized deviations, similar to that of [9] we are able to prove a much tighter bound
of e
e−1 ≈ 1.58 on the Price of Anarchy by showing that the above game is actually (1−
1
e
, 0)-semi-smooth.
Theorem 6 First Price Item-Bidding Auctions are (1 − 1
e
, 0)-semi-smooth for fractionally subadditive bid-
ders.
Proof. Consider a valuation profile v and a bid profile b. Let Opt(v) be the optimal allocation for that type
profile. Let Opti(v) be the set that player i gets atOpt(v). Let a = (a1, . . . , am) be the maximizing additive
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valuation for player i for Opti(v), i.e. vi(Opti(v)) =
∑
j∈Opti(v)
aj and ∀S 6= Opti(v) : vi(S) ≥
∑
j∈S aj
(Such an a exists by the definition of fractionally subadditive valuations). Suppose that player i switches
to bidding a randomized bid with probability density function f(b) = 1
aj−b
for b ∈ [0, aj(1 −
1
e
)] for each
j ∈ Opti(v) and 0 everywhere else. Randomization is independent for each j. Denote with B˜i(v) such a
randomized deviation and b˜i a random draw from B˜i(v). Let Xi(bi) be the random variable that denotes
the items that he wins after the deviation. Thus we have:
ui(B˜i(v), b−i) ≥ Eb˜i∼B˜i(v)[vi(Xi(b˜i))−
∑
j∈Xi(b˜i)
b˜ij ]
≥ Eb˜i∼B˜i(v)[
∑
j∈Xi(b˜i)
aj −
∑
j∈Xi(b˜i)
b˜ij ]
≥ Eb˜i∼B˜i(v)[
∑
j∈Opti(v)
(aj − b˜ij)1{b˜ij ≥ pj(b)}]
=
∑
j∈Opti(v)
Eb˜i∼B˜i(v)
[(aj − b˜ij)1{b˜ij ≥ pj(b)}]
=
∑
j∈Opti(v)
∫ aj(1− 1e )
pj(b)
(aj − t)
1
aj − t
dt
=
∑
j∈Opti(v)
aj
(
1−
1
e
)
− pj(b)
=
(
1−
1
e
)
vi(Opti(v)) −
∑
j∈Opti(v)
pj(b)
Now summing over all players the second term on the right hand side will become the sum of prices over
all items, since the sets Opti(v) are disjoint. Thus we get:
∑
i
uvii (b
′
i(v), b−i) +
∑
j∈[m]
pj(b) ≥
(
1−
1
e
)∑
i
vi(Opti(v)) =
(
1−
1
e
)
SW v(Opt(v)) (5)
Similarly one can also show that for β-fractionally subadditive bidders the First Price Item-Bidding
Auction is ( 1
β
(
1− 1
e
)
, 0)-semi-smooth.
Corollary 7 First Price Item-Bidding Auctions with independent β-fractionally subadditive bidders have
Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy at most e
e−1β.
It is known (see [3]) that subadditive bidders are lnm-fractionally subadditive. Thus the latter gives a
price of anarchy of e
e−1 lnm for subadditive bidders.
The latter result creates an interesting separation between first-price and second price auctions even
in the incomplete information case. For the complete information case it is known that second price item
bidding has price of anarchy at least 2 [5], whilst pure nash equilibria of first price auctions are always
optimal (when a pure nash exists) [6]. The above bound states that such a separation even in the incomplete
information case, since second price has price of anarchy at least 2 whilst first price auctions have price of
anarchy at most ≈ 1.58.
4 Greedy First Price Auctions
In this section we consider the greedy first price auctions introduced by Lucier and Borodin [8]. In a greedy
auction setting there are n bidders and m items. Each bidder i have some private combinatorial valuation
vi on the items that is drawn from some commonly known distribution. The strategies of the players is to
submit a valuation profile bi that outputs a value bi(S) for each set of items S. An allocation is a vector
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A = (A1, . . . , An) that allocates a set Ai for each player i. We assume that there is a predefined subspace
of feasible allocations. The above setting is a generalization of the combinatorial auction setting since we
don’t assume that the allocations Ai must be disjoint, i.e. the same item can potentially be allocated to
more than one players.
A mechanismM(b) = (A(b), p(b)) takes as input a bid profile b and outputs a feasible allocation A(b) and
a vector of prices p(b) that each player has to pay. A mechanism is said to be greedy if the allocation output
by the mechanism is the outcome of a greedy algorithm as we explain. Given bid profile b a greedy algorithm
is defined as follows: Let r : [n] × 2[m] × R → R be a priority function such that r(i, S, v) is the priority of
allocating set S to player i when bi(S) = v. Then the greedy algorithm is as follows: Pick allocation (i, Ai)
that maximizes r(i, S, bi(S)) over all currently feasible allocations (i, S) and allocate set Ai to player i. Then
remove player i. A greedy algorithm is c-approximate if for any bid profile b it returns an allocation that is
at least a c-fraction of the maximum possible allocation given valuation profile b. Moreover, the mechanism
is first price if the payments that the mechanism outputs is pi(b) = bi(Ai).
Given a type profile v and a bid strategy profile b the social welfare is as always the sum of the players’
utilities (including the auctioneer as a player). This boils down to being the value of the allocation
∑
i vi(Ai)
since payments cancel out.
The game defined by a greedy mechanism is a Separable Bayesian Game and in the theorem that follows
we are able to prove that it is also (12 , c− 1) smooth. This leads to a price of anarchy of 2c. This is not an
improvement to the existing result of c+O(log(c)) by Lucier and Borodin, but the analysis is much simpler
and the difference in the two bounds is not big.
Theorem 8 Any Greedy First Price Mechanism based on a c-approximate greedy algorithm defines a Bayesian
Game that is (12 , c− 1)-smooth.
Proof. Given the mechanism M we define as θi(S, b−i) as the critical value that player i has to bid on set
S such that he is allocated set S given the bid profiles of the rest of the players.
In our proof we will use a very nice fact about c-approximate greedy mechanisms that was proved by
Lucier and Borodin. For any c-approximate greedy mechanism and any feasible allocation A′ it must hold
that
∑
i θi(A
′
i, b−i) ≤ c
∑
i bi(Ai) = c
∑
i pi(b).
Now consider a valuation profile v and bid profile b. Let Opti(v) be the set allocated to player i in
the optimal allocation for v. Let b′i(v) be the following bid strategy for player i: he bids vi(Opti(v))/2
single-mindedly on Opti(v), i.e. ∀S 6= Opti(v) : bi(S) = 0 and bi(Opti(v)) =
vi(Opti(v))
2 . There are two
cases: either he gets allocated his optimal item in which case his ui(b
′
i(v), b−i) =
vi(Opti(v))
2 or he doesn’t in
which case: θi(Opti(v), b−i) ≥
vi(Opti(v))
2 . Therefore, we get:
ui(b
′
i(v), b−i) ≥
vi(Opti(v))
2
− θi(Opti(v), b−i) (6)
Summing over all players and using the upper bound on critical price proved by Lucier and Borodin instan-
tiated for A′ = Opt(v) we get:
∑
i
ui(b
′
i(v), b−i) ≥
∑
i
vi(Opti(v))
2
−
∑
i
θi(Opti(v), b−i) ≥
1
2
∑
i
vi(Opti(v)) − c
∑
i
pi(b) (7)
Now, by rearranging we get:
∑
i
ui(b
′
i(v), b−i)+
∑
i
pi(b) ≥
∑
i
vi(Opti(v))
2
−
∑
i
θi(Opti(v), b−i) ≥
1
2
∑
i
vi(Opti(v))− (c− 1)
∑
i
pi(b)
(8)
The latter states that our game satisfies our most relaxed semi-smoothness definition for λ = 12 and
µ = c− 1.
In fact, we can improve our bound on the price of anarchy to e
e−1 c using the same trick of randomized
deviations that we did in item bidding.
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5 Variable Strategy Space Games and Universal Smoothness
In this section we cope with the following more general class of Bayesian Games whose goal is to capture
games where the strategy space of a player not only his utility is dependend on his type. We denote with
Ai(ti) ⊆ Ai the actions available to a player of type ti. A players strategy is a function si : Ti → Ai that
satisfies ∀ti ∈ Ti : si(ti) ∈ Ai(ti). We will denote with A(t) = ×iAi(ti). We still assume that the utility of
a player depends on his type and the actions of the rest of the players: ui : Ti × A → R. We must point
out that the utility of a player i is undefined if ai /∈ Ai(ti). The rest of the definitions are the same as in
our previous definition of Bayesian Games. Our initial definition was a special case of this class of Bayesian
Games where ∀ti ∈ Ti : Ai(ti) = Ai.
For such a Bayesian Game we need a slight alteration of the definition of what it means for a complete
information instance of it to be smooth, since the utility of the complete information instance is undefined
on strategies that are not in the strategy space of a player for that instance.
Definition 9 A Bayesian Game is (λ, µ)-smooth if ∀t ∈ T and for all a, a′ ∈ A(t):∑
i
utii (a
′
i, a−i) ≥ λ
∑
i
utii (a
′)− µ
∑
i
utii (a)
The above class of games is a very general class of Bayesian Game and it is hard to believe that one can
generalize smoothness to such a class. However, a lot of the games in the literature satisfy an even stronger
definition of smoothness. For games that satisfy this stronger definition of smoothness we can generalize
existing results to incomplete information versions of the games.
Definition 10 A Bayesian Game is universally (λ, µ)-smooth iff ∀t, w ∈ T and for all a ∈ A(t), b ∈ A(w):∑
i
uwii (bi, a−i) ≥ λ
∑
i
uwii (b)− µ
∑
i
utii (a)
Since bi ∈ Ai(wi) observe that the first term is also well defined.
Universal smoothness is a more restrictive notion than smoothness, in the sense that if a Bayesian Game
is universally smooth then it is also smooth. This follows from the fact that if we take the definition of
universal smoothness restricted only when t = w then we get the smoothness definition. In addition the two
definitions are equivalent to the smoothness of [11] for complete information games.
Though the above definition seems restrictive enough in the sections that follow we will show that most
routing games studied in the literature are actually universally (λ, µ)-smooth and therefore the bounds known
for the complete information carry over to some natural incomplete information versions.
Theorem 11 If a Bayesian Game with Variable Strategy Space is universally (λ, µ)-smooth then it has
Bayes-Nash PoA at most (1 + µ)/λ.
Proof. Using similar reasoning as in Theorem 2 we can arrive at the conclusion that:
Et[SW
t(s(t))] ≥ EtEw[
∑
i
uwii (Opti(w), s−i(t−i))]
Then we observe that Opt(w) ∈ A(w) and s(t) ∈ A(t). Thus applying the definition of universal smoothness
we get:
Et[SW
t(s(t))] ≥ EtEw[λ
∑
i
uwii (Opt(w)) − µ
∑
i
utii (s(t))]
= λEw[SW
w(Opt(w))] − µEt[SW
t(s(t))]
which gives the theorem.
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5.1 Weighted Congestion Games with Probabilistic Demands
In this section we examine how our analysis applies to incomplete information versions of routing games.
The games that we study in this section are cost minimization games and hence we will use the variants of
our theorems and notation so far adapted to cost minimization games.
We first describe the complete information game. We consider unsplittable atomic selfish routing games
where each player has demand wi that he needs to send from a node si to a node ti over a graph G. Let
Pi be the set of paths from si to ti. The strategy of a player is to choose a path pi ∈ Pi. Each edge e of
the graph has some delay function le(xe) where xe denotes the total congestion of edge e: xe =
∑
i:e∈pi
wi,
which is assumed to be monotone non-decreasing. Given a strategy profile p = (pi)i∈n the cost of a player
is ci(p) =
∑
e∈pi
wile(xe).
In the literature so far only the case where wi are common knowledge has been studied. This is a very
strong informational assumption. Instead it is more natural consider the case where the wi are private
information and only a distribution on them is common knowledge. Thus the type a player in our game is
his weight wi. In fact to make the game comply with our definition of Bayesian Games we will assume that
the strategy of a player is a pair (ri, pi) of a rate ri and path pi. In addition given a type wi a player’s action
space is Ai(wi) = {(wi, pi) : pi ∈ Pi}, i.e. we constraint the player to have to route his whole demand. Given
the above small alteration in the definition of the game it is now easy to see that the cost of a player depends
only on the strategies of the other players and not on their types: ∀ai = (ri, pi) ∈ Ai(ti), ∀a−i = (r−i, p−i) ∈
A−i : c
ti
i (ai, a−i) =
∑
e∈pi
rile(xe(a)) where xe(a) =
∑
k:e∈pk
rk and it’s undefined for ai /∈ Ai(ti). Hence, if
we prove that the latter Bayesian Game is universally (λ, µ)-smooth, this would imply a Bayes-Nash PoA of
λ/(1− µ).
Very recently (Bhawalkar et al [2]) showed that weighted congestion games are smooth games and there-
fore smoothness arguments provide tight results for the Price of Anarchy. Our analysis shows that one can
extend these upper bounds to incomplete information too. Moreover, since complete information is a spe-
cial case of incomplete information where priors are singleton distributions, the bayes-nash price of anarchy
analysis will still be tight. Moreover, this shows a collapse of efficiency between complete and incomplete
information and shows that knowing more doens’t necessarily improve the efficiency guarrantee’s in this
types of games.
Most of the literature on weighted congestion games uses the following fact: if for the class of delay
functions C allowed we have that: ∀x, x∗ ∈ R+ : x∗le(x+x
∗) ≥ λx∗le(x
∗)+µxle(x) then weighted congestion
games with delays in class C are (λ, µ)-smooth. We will actually show that if the delay functions satisfy the
above property then the Bayesian Game is universally (λ, µ)-smooth.
Lemma 12 If for any delay function le() in the class of delay functions C allowed we have that: ∀x, x
∗ ∈
R
+ : x∗le(x + x
∗) ≥ λx∗le(x
∗) + µxle(x) then the resulting class of Bayesian Unsplittable Selfish Routing
Games with Probabilistic Demands is universally (λ, µ)-smooth.
Proof. Let w, t be two type profiles. Let a = (w, p) ∈ A(w) and b = (t, p′) ∈ A(t). Let xe(a) =
∑
i:e∈pi
wi
and xe(b) =
∑
i:e∈p′
i
ti. Then:
∑
i
ctii (bi, a−i) ≤
∑
i
∑
e∈p′
i
tile(ti + xe(a)) ≤
∑
i
∑
e∈p′
i
tile(xe(b) + xe(a))
=
∑
e
xe(b)le(xe(b) + xe(a))
≤λ
∑
e
xe(b)le(xe(b)) + µ
∑
e
xe(a)le(xe(a))
=λ
∑
i
∑
e∈p′
i
tile(xe(b)) + µ
∑
e
∑
e∈pi
wile(xe(a))
=λ
∑
i
ctii (b) + µ
∑
i
cwii (a)
which is exactly the universal smoothness definition.
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5.2 Bayesian Effort Games
In this section we study what our analysis imply for incomplete information versions of the following class
of effort games [1]: There is a set of players [n] and a set of project [m]. Each player has some budget of
effort Bi which he can split among the projects. Each project j has some value that is a non-decreasing
concave function Vj() of the weighted sum of efforts
∑
i∈N aijxij where aij is some ability factor of player
i in project j (we assume V (0) = 0). The value of a project is then split among the participants and each
participant receives a share proportional to his weighted input aijxij . Such games where shown in [1] to be
Valid Utility Games [13] and hence (1, 1)-smooth.
We will consider the natural incomplete information version of these games where each players ability
vector ai = (aij)j∈[m] and the budget Bi are private information, each ability vector is drawn from some
distribution Fi on R
m+1
+ . The Fi are independent. To adapt it in our variable strategy space model we will
assume that the strategy of a player is a pair (a˜i, xi) where a˜i is the declared ability vector and xi is the
vector of efforts of player i. We will constraint the strategy space such that given an ability vector ai the
player has to declare his true ability vector: Ai(ai, Bi) = {(ai, xi) : xi ∈ R
m,
∑
j xij ≤ Bi}.
We are able to show that these games are actually universally smooth games and thereby the Bayes-Nash
PoA of the above Bayesian Games will be at most 2.
Lemma 13 Bayesian Effort Market Games are universally (1, 1)-smooth.
Proof. The proof is an adaptation of the smoothness proof for valid utility games [13, 11], but in the space
of real functions instead of set functions. In addition it is adapted to accommodate for different types of
players so as to show the stronger version of universal smoothness is satisfied.
Let s = (a, x) ∈ A(a,B) and s′ = (b, y) ∈ A(b, B′). Then we have:
∑
i
u
(bi,Bi)
i (s
′
i, s−i) =
∑
i
∑
j
bijyij
Vj(bijyij + a−i · x−i)
bijyij + a−i · x−i
Now we use the fact that for a concave function Vj() that satisfies Vj(0) = 0, it holds that Vj(x)/x is a
decreasing function. Hence:
Vj(bijyij + a−i · x−i)
bijyij + a−i · x−i
≤
Vj(a−i · x−i)
a−i · x−i
=⇒ bijyij
Vj(bijyij + a−i · x−i)
bijyij + a−i · x−i
≥ Vj(bijyij+a−i ·x−i)−Vj(a−i ·x−i)
Thus: ∑
i
u
(bi,Bi)
i (s
′
i, s−i) ≥
∑
i
∑
j
(Vj(bijyij + a−i · x−i)− Vj(a−i · x−i))
In addition, since Vj() is concave, increasing then for all t1 > t2 and y > 0: Vj(y + t1) − Vj(t1) ≤ Vj(y +
t2)− Vj(t2). Combining we get:∑
i
u
(bi,Bi)
i (s
′
i, s−i) ≥
∑
j
∑
i
(Vj(bijyij + a−i · x−i)− Vj(a−i · x−i))
≥
∑
j
∑
i
Vj
(
bijyij + a−i · x−i + aijxij +
i−1∑
k=1
bkjykj
)
− Vj
(
a−i · x−i + aijxij +
i−1∑
k=1
bkjykj
)
=
∑
j
∑
i
Vj
(
i∑
k=1
(bkjykj + akjxkj) +
n∑
k=i+1
akjykj
)
− Vj
(
i−1∑
k=1
(bkjykj + akjxkj) +
n∑
k=i
akjykj
)
=
∑
j
Vj
(
n∑
k=1
(bkjykj + akjxkj)
)
− Vj
(
n∑
k=1
akjxkj
)
≥
∑
j
Vj
(
n∑
k=1
bkjykj
)
− Vj
(
n∑
k=1
akjxkj
)
=SW b,B
′
(s′)− SW a,B(s)
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Corollary 14 The Bayes-Nash PoA of Bayesian Effort Games is at most 2.
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